That's dodging the question again. We assumed the technology exist and is perfect.
I know, I'm just pointing out the other problems of a device, as a seperate issue.
Now, let's try it the other way - suppose the machine vaporize and reform parts of you in place. It cycles your finger (assuming it's done clean enough not to sense any pain). Are you still you, not copy?
Now, the whole body except the head. Still you?
Now body and skull except for brain.
Then with some brain parts.
Etc.
Where would you stop being you and became a copy?
The minute it cycled through your finger. You'd then be partially a copy, then progressively become a copy and regressively become you.
Of course, if the finger was assembled using the atoms it was dissasembled from, it's almost like a remuddling of the finger; if one could imagine somehow breaking grandma's teapot, and then somehow reforming and refiring the clay from the fragments. Still not the same teapot.
Don't all your cells replace themselves periodically? This reminds me of this paradox.
Yeah, but that's a whole different process; a process that occurs on the small scale, gradually. Non-bone cells in the human body have an average age of about 10 years (apparently).
This is different. It's a discrete destructive event. You're destroying something and then creating another something.
It isn't about emotions, it isn't about perceptions, it's
the way the universe works. An object is not just a pile of data, it's an object. What it is isn't defined only by its structure, or what atoms it is made of, but
how and
why and
where it came to exist.
Basically, as I understand it, the argument here is that the copy is the same entity as the original. But if both the copy and the original exist, how can they possibly both be the same entity? And if there are billions of copies, how can they all be the same entity simultaneously?
Sorry, but it's just entirely illogical. The sort of philosophical, emotional value stuff fits into it as well, but logically it just doesn't work out. They're two different entities, and while they might be identical, they're still different entities.
Then if none of them knew it was done, then none of them would ever notice a difference. Emotional attachment is an imaginary value, and such values can change rapidly as history shows.
So the core of the human psyche is imaginary? I'll remember that... :facepalm:
Not necessarily.
Cell-level reproduction should probably be largest sufficient one, with the same statistical distribution of active chemicals - atoms are swapped in and out of a living thing constantly. But it really is something we would only find out experimentally.
Cell-level replication would be incredibly sloppy- there are all sorts of fine structures in there that you could miss entirely, trace elements that you would not include, and fine states that you would not capture.
Practical aspect of such machine would have to be very well thought out and tested for all kinds of worse-than-death accidental stuff.
One could potentially consider the use of such a machine as a fate worse than death...