Teleportation (forked from Sci-Fi Anti-G suit design)

[T.Neo]

Because you are being destroyed.

The copy isn't you. It's like you, identical to you, but it isn't you. It's a seperate entity.

 

[Artlav]

Yes.

Again, why do you think it matters?
What is there to prize the original over the copy?

 

[T.Neo]

Because the original is the original- the real object.

The copy isn't that object. It doesn't matter that it's identical. It's a different object.

 

[Artlav]

Yes, but you keep repeating that without explaining why does it matter.

Again, why do you think it matters?
What is there to prize the original over the copy?

 

[jedidia]

This is getting pretty circular here :lol:

I think the major problem is that "I" stop to exist. Purely objectively, in case of a teleporter, I am destroyed and a perfect copy of me will be created at the destination. Since the copy is perfect, it will be me to itself and all the rest of the world, and it will proudly proclaim that the teleport works, since it also has the memory of entering the teleporter and getting out at the other side. Objectively, there's absolutely no difference.

The problem here that concerns T.Neo (and me for that matter) is not so much one of metaphysics, but of subjectivism. I am NOT the copy, although the copy is I. This would become clear if I wouldn't get destroyed on the sending platform. The copy emerging at the other end has full right to proclaim that it is I, since it stepped on the teleporter and stepped through it, coming out at the other end. Yet "I" am still around and cannot claim to be the copy, because all I did was stay on the platform. Hence I would say that the Teleport didn't work, while my clone would say that it worked. This shows that I and the clone are not the same.
In short, if "I" get destroyed in the sending process, "I" will seize to exist. I won't even notice it of course, but subjectively, I am no more. Although the clone has full right and reason to think it is "I", "I" cannot be him. That's what it comes down to on the subjective level.

 

[Artlav]

TI think the major problem is that "I" stop to exist.

What is this "I" you talk about? Where is it located?
I thought we already assumed that no souls are involved.

 

[T.Neo]

:facepalm:

If I am the original, I get destroyed, and then a copy of me is created. That copy is another I. I, along with the original, have been destroyed.

If I am copied but not destroyed, I exist and so does the copy. I am not the copy and the copy is not me. The copy is a different entity.

 

[jedidia]

I thought we already assumed that no souls are involved.

It's not about souls. It's about subjective perception. That's why I described the procedure with me being left intact: If there's two of us after teleportation, The clone, from its subjective point of view, is I. I however, from my subjective point of view, am not the clone.
Hence, if I think through the experiment with me being destroyed and the clone being created, I must conclude that the I that would be left standing on the platform, were it not destroyed, is gone.

 

[Artlav]

I, along with the original, have been destroyed.

So it's "I" and the original?
Do you find the existence of this soul necessary?

If we assume there are souls, external to the universe, then it's an entirely different discussion.

 

[jedidia]

I think we cross-posted :lol:

 

[Artlav]

I must conclude that the I that would be left standing on the platform, were it not destroyed, is gone.

Other than a soul, i can't see what is missing. What else is this "I" you differentiate from your body?

 

[jedidia]

As I said, objectivly nothing. Also, I won't notice anything of the whole process, and for all that matters practically the teleporter works.

However, if I play the mind-experiment I stated before on a subjective level, I must assume that I won't be anymore and instead another I will live on. It's a pure matter of subjective perception, which tells me logically that if I would still exist were I not deliberatly destroyed, I will indeed be destroyed. It doesn't matter practically, but it would be a reason for me to not step through the teleporter. Because in my subjective perception, I will be no more.

 

[Artlav]

Because in my subjective perception, I will be no more.

And what would be it what have this subjective perception?

 

[jedidia]

I, before the teleport. Which is in the end all that matters to make a decision about wheather or not I'll use the thing.

 

[Artlav]

That explains the choice, but does not answer the question.

 

[T.Neo]

As I said, objectivly nothing. Also, I won't notice anything of the whole process, and for all that matters practically the teleporter works.

That's not strictly true. Objectively it's still a different object, if not distinguished by its physical features, certainly by its history.

Though the teleporter would still "work" (in terms of creating a copy), and the copy would not notice anything amiss...

 

[Artlav]

Objectively it's still a different object, if not distinguished by its physical features, certainly by its history.

Though the teleporter would still "work" (in terms of creating a copy), and the copy would not notice anything amiss...

And yet you insist that something will be lost, and still can't point our exactly what would it be.

 

[jedidia]

And yet you insist that something will be lost, and still can't point our exactly what would it be.

You know, this all starts to heavily remind me of the movie "the prestige"... Teleported Angier was Angier, but another Angier had to be killed (in the movie by drowning, in the first experiment by shooting him) to make the trick work. Now, the question is, how is shooting the original on the platform any different from otherwise disasembling his physical structure?

 

[Artlav]

Only different in the amount of mess it makes, reliability and public image.

You still need to assume a soul or something external to get a difference before and after.
Unless you can point at anything else that is lost?

 

[T.Neo]

The person who is destroyed. :facepalm: