Science How the Space Shuttle Killed an American Halley’s Comet Mission

[Graham2001]

A very interesting article on a period I've always termed the 'Black Gap' in the US space program.

NASA missed the chance to visit Halley’s Comet in 1986 when the famed sentinel swung close to Earth, as it does every 76 years. Luckily for history, the Europeans flew Giotto past it on this day (March 13) in 1976, and some other nations sent their own probes.

The full story of NASA’s withdrawal is in Bruce Murray’s Journey Into Space: The First Three Decades of Space Exploration. Murray, the former director of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, has chapters upon chapters on Halley...

http://www.universetoday.com/100709/how-the-space-shuttle-killed-an-american-halleys-comet-mission/

The kicker comes at the end, where we find out just what finally killed one NASA comet mission...

 

[Unstung]

There is an article that details specifically the canceled shuttle mission to observe Halley's Comet, STS-61-E, on AmericaSpace. Of course, the cancellation was a result of the Challenger disaster. It is very intriguing and adds to the disappointment over the potential of lost missions.
(Part I)
(Part II)

 

[Urwumpe]

Still... if you look how many probes observed Halley, this isn't really a bad story.

[ame="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halley_Armada"]Halley Armada - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia[/ame]

 

[garyw]

To me, the shuttle was never a failure. What was a failure was US policy of putting as many missions as possible onto the Shuttle and winding down the EELV line.

Whilst NASA may have missed Halley if it wasn't for NASA we'd have never visited Neptune or Uranus, Mercury, Vesta, Tempel 1 (twice!) so I don't think they have done too badly!

 

[Urwumpe]

Well, putting all your eggs into one basket is never a really smart idea (but sometimes the best option).

The only bad thing I see about the Shuttle: It was never developed from prototype status to a proper flight article. Until the last mission, it was always an experiment.

There had been really many suggestions how to solve the problems, reduce costs and make a better standard shuttle - but these suggestions never got the budget, because after all, the prototype did the job, right?

 

[garyw]

The only bad thing I see about the Shuttle: It was never developed from prototype status to a proper flight article. Until the last mission, it was always an experiment.

Shuttle was rushed. There were supposed to be 6 test flights but that was cut to four then Regan declares it operational...

There had been really many suggestions how to solve the problems, reduce costs and make a better standard shuttle - but these suggestions never got the budget, because after all, the prototype did the job, right?

There always was little that could be done to the existing fleet. I would have liked to have see a 'Shuttle 2' or a 'Shuttle lite'. I think John Muratore had the right idea with the CRV. A shame some of those concepts were not developed further.

 

[Urwumpe]

Shuttle was rushed. There were supposed to be 6 test flights but that was cut to four then Regan declares it operational...

Not just that. It was also terribly mismanaged from the start. Like the CAIB said, it would have needed hundreds of flight hours with the final configuration to call it operational. Instead it was flown just a few 100 times with changing configurations.

There always was little that could be done to the existing fleet. I would have liked to have see a 'Shuttle 2' or a 'Shuttle lite'. I think John Muratore had the right idea with the CRV. A shame some of those concepts were not developed further.

I would already have liked a "Shuttle 1.1". The basic configuration wasn't bad, it just had the devil in its details. Alone the huge number of specialist systems, that required special consumables and special periphery. By streamlining this more, a lot of mass and costs could have been reduced.

Take for example the APUs. Self-contained. Can operate by just a few volts to power the electronics. Has its own cooling system. But: Everything that requires hydraulic power by the APU doesn't work at all without the rest of the Shuttle. It is nice that the APUs could be started when the rest of the Shuttle is almost completely dead. But they serve no purpose then.

The planned electrical hydraulic pumps would have been much lighter, easier to maintain (no longer tanking hydrazine), but would have required two fuel cells running to deliver the needed power. (One fuel cell couldn't keep the pressure in all three hydraulic systems and power the rest of the Shuttle)

 

[Hlynkacg]

Shuttle was rushed. There were supposed to be 6 test flights but that was cut to four then Regan declares it operational...

Sorry, I don't buy that as an excuse. Most of the issues that plagued the shuttle were either institutional or intrinsic in it's design. No amount of test flights or "taking it slow" was going to solve them.

 

[BruceJohnJennerLawso]

Sorry, I don't buy that as an excuse. Most of the issues that plagued the shuttle were either institutional or intrinsic in it's design. No amount of test flights or "taking it slow" was going to solve them.

So you dont think the last Shuttle flight was any safer than the first?

I gotta agree with you there. I do think the shuttle was inherently flawed in many ways that no amount of testing could solve. Its a miracle that the lack of a real abort system on the pad didnt kill a crew on its own.

 

[Hlynkacg]

So you dont think the last Shuttle flight was any safer than the first?

I gotta agree with you there. I do think the shuttle was inherently flawed in many ways that no amount of testing could solve. Its a miracle that the lack of a real abort system on the pad didnt kill a crew on its own.

Almost, but not quite.

I know my position is controversial on this forum but...

The lack of on pad abort doesn't concern me. What concerns me is that Columbia's final fate could have befallen ANY of Shuttle flight. That we didn't lose any of the other Shuttles in the same way, before or after, was luck rather than competence on NASA's part.

There's also the question of simple economics, the Shuttle was incredibly ill-suited for it's primary missions, and it's vaunted re-usability really wasn't. If you're going to disassembled then reassemble an aircraft after each flight you might as well save yourself the money and man-hours by building a new one from scratch.

...and that's if we ignore the fact that most of the decisions that NASA makes in regards to launch vehicles are made for political reasons rather than engineering.

 

[BruceJohnJennerLawso]

The lack of on pad abort doesn't concern me. What concerns me is that Columbia's final fate could have befallen ANY of Shuttle flight. That we didn't lose any of the other Shuttles in the same way, before or after, was luck rather than competence on NASA's part.

There's also the question of simple economics, the Shuttle was incredibly ill-suited for it's primary missions, and it's vaunted re-usability really wasn't. If you're going to disassembled then reassemble an aircraft after each flight you might as well save yourself the money and man-hours by building a new one from scratch.

Very true. From what I understand, many other shuttles came back missing heat tiles, just Columbia was unlucky to have it on the leading edge of the wing...

The shuttle was awful economically speaking too, something like 2 or 3 times that of expendables? I would debate you on it being unsuited for its primary mission, as it was a reasonably good platform for servicing the HST, and for station building, but that short operational lifetime (12 days?) made it useless compared to the Soyuz.

All of this being said, I have the highest respect for those people who worked in the program, they arguably took on a heavier workload than Apollo did, & did it well, but the Shuttle was not a good launch system.

I wonder what would have happened if NASA had revived the Gemini hardware. That always seemed like a really efficient setup, what with only needing a Titan for launch...

 

[T.Neo]

No amount of test flights or "taking it slow" was going to solve them.

No, but acting on the experience from such flights, fixing serious issues and altering problem areas of the design could have improved the overall situation, if not outright solved the flaws in the system.

The lack of on pad abort doesn't concern me. What concerns me is that Columbia's final fate could have befallen ANY of Shuttle flight. That we didn't lose any of the other Shuttles in the same way, before or after, was luck rather than competence on NASA's part.

That's not necessarily true. After Columbia, several safety systems and procedures were implemented- the OBSS and the RPM enabling a survey of TPS damage, a degree of TPS repair ability, and the ability to use the ISS as a safe haven should a problem arise (as well as a launch-on-need mission on the pad in the case of STS-125, the only post-Columbia flight not to the ISS).

Not to mention the fact that the foam bipod ramp was removed. If LOV-inducing TPS damage occured, it would not be due to the same reasons as with Columbia (the foam bipod ramp detaching), and if it did happen, the outcome would likely have been different.

A shuttle could have been lost due to TPS damage after Columbia, but action was taken to enhance the safety of the crews in regard to this issue, which is more than could be said about launch escape for the crew, which never existed on the shuttle.

 

[garyw]

Very true. From what I understand, many other shuttles came back missing heat tiles, just Columbia was unlucky to have it on the leading edge of the wing...

Columbia was never 'missing a tile' from the wing. Damage to the wing was caused by a chunk of foam impacting it.

Sorry, I don't buy that as an excuse. Most of the issues that plagued the shuttle were either institutional or intrinsic in it's design. No amount of test flights or "taking it slow" was going to solve them.

Taking it slowly would have avoided many issues that were seen in the early days of flight and allowed NASA to build up an anomaly database. Towards the end of the program most of the issues that were seen had a history which allowed the controllers much greater insight into the actual root cause of the problem and plan for either on orbit fixes or post landing fixes.

 

[BruceJohnJennerLawso]

Columbia was never 'missing a tile' from the wing. Damage to the wing was caused by a chunk of foam impacting it.

But the assumption was that the tiles in question were either gone, or had a hole punched into the gap between them, right? My point was that similar incidents had happened throughout the shuttle program, but the 2003 disaster was caused by damage in an area that was critical. Hlynkacgs point still stands: there was a chance for a similar disaster to occur on every single flight before the accident, and a reduced chance of it happening on every single one after 2003.

I do think the overall safety of the Shuttle improved later in the program, but the actual usefulness of it was cut down to almost nil when it was forced to launch to the ISS every mission (or have a second shuttle waiting at KSC).

 

[Cras]

There's also the question of simple economics, the Shuttle was incredibly ill-suited for it's primary missions, and it's vaunted re-usability really wasn't. If you're going to disassembled then reassemble an aircraft after each flight you might as well save yourself the money and man-hours by building a new one from scratch.

The Shuttle's primary mission was to build a space station. It just didn't get around to doing that until rather late into its life. There is no vehicle that comes even remotely close to being as well suited for the purpose.

Its secondary mission was to repair in orbit, at which there is nothing even remotely close to being as well suited for such a purpose.

It was the first reusable spacecraft....a milestone that should stand on its own merits, as that is the way of the future, as is space planes. The only way that legacy can be diminished is if the engineers that develop the next several manned spacecraft treat the Shuttle as just a blip on the progress of space flight, and instead look to build in the legacy of Apollo and the like. There is something to be said for not wanting to use single use capsules.

Yes, the Shuttle was incredibly hard to fly, but it was the first of its kind. Its legacy should be as the inspiration for the future, as a stepping stone to even better and safer re-usable space planes, not as some relic of the past when mankind decided to try something different. It should not be seen as merely a phase, but rather the next logical step.

 

[BruceJohnJennerLawso]

The Shuttle's primary mission was to build a space station. It just didn't get around to doing that until rather late into its life. There is no vehicle that comes even remotely close to being as well suited for the purpose.

Its secondary mission was to repair in orbit, at which there is nothing even remotely close to being as well suited for such a purpose.

Can you provide us with a list of what things made it excel at those tasks?
Ive always suspected that as well, but I cant think of any reasons why it would be better.

There is something to be said for not wanting to use single use capsules.

Yes, the Shuttle was incredibly hard to fly, but it was the first of its kind. Its legacy should be as the inspiration for the future, as a stepping stone to even better and safer re-usable space planes, not as some relic of the past when mankind decided to try something different. It should not be seen as merely a phase, but rather the next logical step.

Well it is worth considering that both the Dragon & Orion casules are planned to be reuseable ( about 7-8 flights I think. Dont quote me on that)

The argument on that is really not conclusive, but I would disagree with you there. From everything Ive seen on reuseable spaceplanes, they wont be coming for a long time, if at all. The problem is not that we dont have the technologies for them, its more a matter of getting all of the technologies involved to work together properly at the same time. Spaceplanes might become feasible tommorow for all I know, the fields that they would depend on , such as materials science are always being researched, & the right technology might be discovered tomorrow, but I doubt it. I feel that expendables are ultimately the best way to go for now :shrug:

 

[Andy44]

To me, the shuttle was never a failure.

STS was absolutely a failure relative to what NASA promised in terms of flight rate, safety, and costs. It was only a success in terms of fulfilling a technical goal. It did amazing things, but it cost way more than NASA said it would. It was a good first try at spaceplanes, though, a remarkable technical achievement.

That said, whining that STS "killed" a Halley mission is no different than saying it "killed" any other NASA program, such as continued lunar exploration or a manned Mars mission. NASA thought STS was more important than Halley, and a good case can be made for that, given that ESA had it covered anyway. Science data is science data, after all, national pride notwithstanding.

What STS tried to kill, politically, was the Titan and other expendable programs, in order to corner the satellite launch market. This turned out to be a huge mistake when the fleet was grounded after Challenger, and led to the revival of Titan IV and today's newer fleet of reliable vehicles such as Delta 4 and Atlas V, which resulted from the USAF removing itself from NASA's bozone layer and focusing on practical space launch needs.

 

[BruceJohnJennerLawso]

That said, whining that STS "killed" a Halley mission is no different than saying it "killed" any other NASA program, such as continued lunar exploration or a manned Mars mission. NASA thought STS was more important than Halley, and a good case can be made for that, given that ESA had it covered anyway. Science data is science data, after all, national pride notwithstanding.

Yeah, I really dont think NASA was even missed at the Halley encounter. All things considered, Halley is only really significant in human terms - because it happens to be a very bright comet that humans can usually see once in their lifetimes (~80 year period). Other than that its just another big snowball.

What STS tried to kill, politically, was the Titan and other expendable programs, in order to corner the satellite launch market. This turned out to be a huge mistake when the fleet was grounded after Challenger, and led to the revival of Titan IV and today's newer fleet of reliable vehicles such as Delta 4 and Atlas V, which resulted from the USAF removing itself from NASA's bozone layer and focusing on practical space launch needs.

I never heard much about STS pushing other programs out of the way during development, but the grounding after Challenger hurt it more than the accident did itself. NASA promised too high, delivered a bit too low, & the resulting gap killed the shuttles reputation.

I take it you feel that the USAF removing itself from the bozone layer was bad for NASA?

 

[MaverickSawyer]

But the assumption was that the tiles in question were either gone, or had a hole punched into the gap between them, right? My point was that similar incidents had happened throughout the shuttle program, but the 2003 disaster was caused by damage in an area that was critical. Hlynkacgs point still stands: there was a chance for a similar disaster to occur on every single flight before the accident, and a reduced chance of it happening on every single one after 2003.

I do think the overall safety of the Shuttle improved later in the program, but the actual usefulness of it was cut down to almost nil when it was forced to launch to the ISS every mission (or have a second shuttle waiting at KSC).

It hit squarely in the center of the leading edge RCC panels, and blew a hole clean through a whole panel (or so they believe: we'll never know what ACTUALLY got hit ), not blowing away a panel or hitting the gap between two panels.

 

[garyw]

But the assumption was that the tiles in question were either gone, or had a hole punched into the gap between them, right? My point was that similar incidents had happened throughout the shuttle program

No. Completely wrong. Tiles are not RCC. Tile DAMAGE was expected, had happened and continued to happen. At no point was the RCC compromised. It was even known that any breach to the RCC would be fatal. It was a CRIT 1 item.

http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/11/columbias-last-flight/304204/1/