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The N-1 failures actually had one simple cause: The stage was never tested as whole because there was no sufficiently large test stand in the USSR. It was intentionally flight tested, but the N-1 proved to be very expensive for flight testing and the number of tests flights had been limited by costs. All in all, a very bad mixture.
Safety in spaceflight means just that, based on what you know what can go wrong, all that you can control has to stay controlled. Perfect safety is not possible, never. What you can do is staying in control as long as possible. The Shuttle is a good example why entering uncontrollable regimes is a poor choice - the first minutes of flight had no abort options, thus the options to stay in control had been limited.
Safety is not about preventing every accident. A launch abort is a mission failure, but no failure of safety. If nobody is harmed in the process, the launch abort was working perfectly and the situation remained under control.
The goal is simply that only a few missions fail. The less missions fail, the better it is. But if the safety measures for a set success goal cost more than the additional successful missions gained, you have to be cold-hearted and not implement such expensive safety measures - and that is only the design. Safety itself is a duty for every person in the organisation. As long as the crew is not harmed by preventable accidents (The Space Shuttle had two such preventable accidents), the safety management process in your company or spaceflight agency works. If one small step there does not work properly, you won't have safety.
Fewer big engines won't increase safety at all, if the stage as system is not properly tested - not just during R&D, but during the full rocket (and rocket engine) lifecycle. And big engines require much more testing and much more costs. A small rocket engine can be tested with a small test stand and requires not much instrumentation. A big one has complex combustion processes and chamber acoustics, that you need to monitor and tune during the process. No computer simulation exists that can handle such phenomena properly - they are pretty chaotic, small changes in the inputs mean big changes in the resulting engine behavior.
A Falcon 9 with 5 new engines would not be cheaper or more reliable by design.
Safety in spaceflight means just that, based on what you know what can go wrong, all that you can control has to stay controlled. Perfect safety is not possible, never. What you can do is staying in control as long as possible. The Shuttle is a good example why entering uncontrollable regimes is a poor choice - the first minutes of flight had no abort options, thus the options to stay in control had been limited.
Safety is not about preventing every accident. A launch abort is a mission failure, but no failure of safety. If nobody is harmed in the process, the launch abort was working perfectly and the situation remained under control.
The goal is simply that only a few missions fail. The less missions fail, the better it is. But if the safety measures for a set success goal cost more than the additional successful missions gained, you have to be cold-hearted and not implement such expensive safety measures - and that is only the design. Safety itself is a duty for every person in the organisation. As long as the crew is not harmed by preventable accidents (The Space Shuttle had two such preventable accidents), the safety management process in your company or spaceflight agency works. If one small step there does not work properly, you won't have safety.
Fewer big engines won't increase safety at all, if the stage as system is not properly tested - not just during R&D, but during the full rocket (and rocket engine) lifecycle. And big engines require much more testing and much more costs. A small rocket engine can be tested with a small test stand and requires not much instrumentation. A big one has complex combustion processes and chamber acoustics, that you need to monitor and tune during the process. No computer simulation exists that can handle such phenomena properly - they are pretty chaotic, small changes in the inputs mean big changes in the resulting engine behavior.
A Falcon 9 with 5 new engines would not be cheaper or more reliable by design.
(and S.P. Korolev)